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A NEW PRIVATE ACTION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
SWENSON V. EMERSON ELECTRIC CO.
By the late 1960's, statistics revealed that a total of twenty million people
were injured or killed annually in consumer product-related accidents.' Con-
gress reacted by establishing a committee to investigate the adequacy of con-
sumer protection against unreasonable risks caused by hazardous household
products.' This committee concluded that producers of hazardous products are
in the best position to safeguard consumers against injury, but found that
many producers lacked motivation to engage in meaningful self-regulation.3
Consequently, they recommended the creation of a federal regulatory agency.
Congress responded by enacting the Consumer Product Safety Act
(CPSA),4 and by establishing the Consumer Product Safety Commission (Com-
mission). Under provisions of the CPSA, the Commission requires importers,
manufacturers, and distributors of consumer products to report immediately to
the Commission instances in which a product fails to comply with a safety rule
or has a defect that could create a substantial product hazard.' Ideally, these
reports allow the Commission to take remedial actions to minimize the dangers
of the hazardous product. Through the early alert, the Commission can begin
to investigate the hazards before they reach epidemic proportions. The Com-
mission intended to provide "... . a fence around the top of the cliff rather than
providing an ambulance in the valley below."6
However, the system of voluntary hazard reporting has not been suc-
cessful due to the lack of compliance by industry.' The Commission surmises
that noncompliance may be more the result of ignorance than of intent
Nonetheless, the Commission has emphasized that failure to comply with
reporting requirements could adversely affect the delinquent companies.' In
addition to civil and criminal penalties the Commission can seek pursuant to
the CPSA, ° recent court decisions have recognized a private cause of action. A
INATIONAL COMM. ON PRODUCT SAFETY. FINAL REPORT I (1970).
'Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466 (1967); see also S.J. Res. 33, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 113 CON(;. REt
31,282-83 (1967) [resolution establishing the National Commission on Product Safety (NCPS)J.
'The NCPS observed that producers owe the public a duty to eliminate unnecessary risks of injury and are in
the best position to know how to design, construct, and prescribe uses of products to achieve that goal.
NCPS FINAL REPORT. supra note I, at 4.
'Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1976 & Supp. V 1981, 1982).
'See infra notes 17 and 22.
62 NATIONAL COMM'N ON PRODUCT SAFETY HEARINGS 145 (1970) (statement of Thomas F. Lambert, Jr.).
'in STATEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY ON PRODUCT HAZARD REPORTS. 49 Fed. Reg. 13, 820 (April 6,
1984), the Commission noted that of the 25 most serious hazard files it opened in 1983, only five were
reported pursuant to provisions of 16 C.F.R. § 1115. 1.
'See Babij, "Industry Fails to Report Products Hazards," Trial Oct. 1984, p. 62.
'Id. at 62.
"See In re Honeywell, CPSC Docket No. 83-2 (March 1983).
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private cause of action puts authority in the Commission's warning to delin-
quent companies. This analysis of Swenson v. Emerson Electric Co.," will
describe the parameters of that private cause of action.
THE FACTS
Edward Swenson acquired a Mark I Glasscote water heater designed,
manufactured, and distributed by A.O. Smith Corporation in September of
1977.12 The water heater incorporated thermostatic gas control valves man-
ufactured by Emerson Electric Company. Swenson had the water heater in-
stalled in his residence. On September 10, 1979, he attempted to relight the
pilot light on the heater when an explosion and flash fire occurred. 3 The explo-
sion and fire ultimately caused his death.
Edward Swenson's wife, Janet Swenson brought this products liability
suit against A.O. Smith and Emerson Electric Company. 5
On June 14, 1983, Mrs. Swenson moved for leave to file a second amend-
ed complaint to include a claim for damages under the CPSA. 6 The new claim
sought to establish liability for damages based upon the companies' alleged in-
tentional failure to report to the Commission a defect in their product which
they had a reasonable basis to believe presented a substantial product hazard in
violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 2064(b)(1982).' 7
Defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that Mrs. Swenson had
no cause of action under the CPSA and that the claim under the Act was barred
by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted plaintiff leave to amend
her complaint, but certified the issues.' 8 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
"374 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1985).
' Swenson. 374 N.W.2d at 693. Unless stated otherwise, the facts are derived from the Minnesota Supreme
Court opinion,
"Plaintiff Janet Swenson averred that the explosion was caused by an accumulation of LP gas due to a
defective water heater valve manufactured by the Emerson Electric Company. Id. at 693.
-rhe plaintiffs complaint alleged negligence in design and manufacture of the water heater, negligent
failure to warn of the defect, breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. and strict
liability. Plaintiff also sought punitive damages alleging that defendants acted with willful indifference to the
rights and safety of others. Id. at 693.
"Mr. Swenson died on September 21, 1979. Mrs. Swenson commenced the action on April 10, 1981 and
thereafter amended her complaint for the first time on March 17. 1982. Id. at 693.
'15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (1982).
"Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and every distributor and retailer of
such product, who obtains information which reasonably supports the conclusion that such product -
I. fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule; or
2. contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard described in subsection )a)(2) of
this section, shall immediately inform the Commission of such failure to comply or of such defect,
unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has actual knowledge that the Commission has
been adequately informed of such defect or failure to comply.
15 U.S.C. § 2064(b).
Is 1. Does Section 23 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2072, provide a private right of action for violation of
the non-binding interpretive regulation issued by the Commission at Isicl C.F.R. Part 1115?
2. Does the Section 23 claim asserted in plaintiffs second amended complaint arise out of the "same
[Vol. 20:1
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court.19 The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review since the CPSA issue
was one of first impression, and ultimately affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals. Minnesota thereby joined an expanding, but limited, number of
jurisdictions in providing a private cause of action for injured consumers under
the CPSA.2 0
Key issues and party contentions are for the most part similar in all ac-
tions of this type. Every court which has found such a cause of action2 has
been forced to dismantle several well based defensive pleadings. For a plaintiff
to succeed in bringing this new action, he must present persuasive reasoning
on the issues confronted in Swenson. The following is a discussion of those
issues.
JURISDICTION
As an initial matter, the statutory language of Section 2072,22 providing
that an injured party may sue in any federal district court for violation of the
CPSA, had to be interpreted to determine whether it was intended to be a
grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Previously, disputes regarding private
claims under the CPSA were handled in federal district courts.2 3 Since Mrs.
Swenson funneled her claim through the Minnesota courts, she had to per-
suade the court that concurrent jurisdiction existed.
Concluding that state and federal courts possess concurrent jurisdiction
over private causes of action under the CPSA, the court stood by case prece-
dent, congressional intent and logic.2
In considering the propriety of state court jurisdiction, the court began
transaction or occurrence" that is the subject of plaintiffs original claims, within the meaning of
Rule 15.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, so that plaintiffs untimely filing of the
Amended claim is made timely by application of the Minnesota Relation-Back Doctrine?
Swenson v. The Emerson Electric Co., 356 N.W.2d 313, 316 (Minn. App. 1984).
"Id. at 319.
O'Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 560 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. N.Y. 1983); Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls
Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981); Drake v. Lochinar Water Heater, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 549 ID. Minn.
1985) (this decision was certified to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 26, 1985); Wilson v.
Robertshaw Controls Co., 600 F. Supp. 671, 673-75 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 578 F.
Supp. 733, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
2 Two jurisdictions have ruled that no private cause of action exists under the Act. See Kahn v. Sears Roe-
buck and Co., 607 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Ga. 1985) and Morris v. Coleco, Indus., 587 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Va.
1984).
"The CPSA provides a private cause of action at 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a)(1982):
Any person who shall sustain injury by reason of any knowing (including willful) violation of a con-
sumer product safety rule, or any other rule or order issued by the Commission may sue any person
who knowingly (including willfully) violated any such rule or order in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent ...
"See supra note 20.
'"The presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by un-
mistakable implication from legislative history, or by clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction
and federal interests." Gulf Off Shore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-79 (1981).
Summer, 19861 R ECENT CASES
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with the presumption that Minnesota state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdic-
tion. Then, reviewing Section 2072, the court found no explicit grant of exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the federal courts. A review of the legislative history of the
CPSA did not reveal any consideration of the jurisdictional issue." Finally, the
Swenson court believed it unlikely that Congress intended federal courts to
have exclusive jurisdiction in this type of action. They reasoned that actions
under the CPSA would also be asserting claims of state common law viola-
tions. 6
These factors lead to the conclusion that state and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over private causes of action under the Act. More im-
portantly, the plaintiff cleared the first hurdle.
TIMELINESS OF THE CLAIM
Prior to considering whether the Act provided for a private cause of ac-
tion, the court had to consider whether the plaintiff commenced the claim
within the required limitations period. Unlike similar cases such as Butcher v.
Robertshow Controls Co.,27 and Young v. Robertshow Controls Co.,28 Mrs.
Swenson sought to amend her complaint to include an action under the CPSA.
Her amendment came more than three years after the death of her husband. 9
Since the CPSA contains no limitations period, the plaintiff had to overcome
several obstacles.
First, it was necessary to determine the appropriate statute of limitations.
Second, if the amended complaint was untimely, then it would have been barred
unless the court found that it related back to the original complaint."
In dispensing with the first question, the Swenson court noted that their
task was to borrow an analogous statute of limitations from Minnesota law 3
since the action under the CPSA would arise from the same occurrences that
give rise to liability under state common law.32 Because the court was cogni-
"See H.R. REP. No. 92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-49 (1972); S. REP. No. 92-835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1972
U.S. CODE CON6. & AD. NEWS 4573: CONE. REP. No. 92-1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.: 1972 U.S. CODE CON;.
& AD. NEws 4596.
: The Minnesota Supreme Court's belief held correct for Mrs. Swenson's claim. Swenson. 374 N.W.2d at
693.
"'This particular holding was never reached before by any other courts handling private claims under the
CPSA. See supra note 20.
'"See supra note 20.
-'Mr. Swenson died on September 21, 1979 and Mrs. Swenson sought a second amendment on June 14,
1983. Id.
"Pursuant to MINN R. Civ. P. 15.03., which provides: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." This rule parallels FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) thus,
an action in federal court would be similarly faced with this issue of relation back.
3 The Court's reasoning was taken from DelCostello v. International 8d. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158
11983).
'
2Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 693.
[Vol. 20:1
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zant of the fact that state legislatures do not draft their limitation periods with
national interests in mind,3 the court would not apply Minnesota law in a
manner that would frustrate the CPSA and its national policy."
The court's decision35 to apply an analogous state statute resulted in ap-
plication of the Minnesota wrongful death statute. 6 That statute provides that
actions must be commenced within three years after the date of death. 7 Mrs.
Swenson's amended claim under the CPSA would have been barred had the
court not found that it related back3 8 to the date of the original complaint. 9
Defense counsel posed several arguments to the contrary.
A.O. Smith and Emerson Electric argued that the amended claim under
the CPSA is so different from the other claims advanced by Mrs. Swenson in
her original complaint" that the amended claim did not provide the defendants
with sufficient notification.' The defendants further pointed out that the
amended claim involved their understanding of, and compliance with, Com-
mission rules. These issues require an examination of the relationship between
defendants and the Commission, not the relationship between defendants and
the decedent.
In the final analysis, the court did not find these defensive arguments per-
suasive. Instead, they ruled that the defendants had sufficient notice from the
original complaint.43 Meshing the claim requirements with the actual notice of
the accident and injury4 given to the defendants, the court held that the plain-
tiffs late assertion overcame the limitations period. More specifically, the
court stated that the CPSA claim requires proof that (1) the water heater was
defective; (2) the defect created a hazard; (3) the defendant knew of the defect;
3 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) [quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975)1.
-'As noted by several intellectuals, Congress enacted the CPSA in response to the need for a legal remedy
designed to prevent injury due to defective products, rather than just provide compensation after an injury
had already occurred. Comment, Consumer Product Safety Act & Private Causes of Action for Personal In-
jury: What does a Consumer Gain?. 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 115 (1978). See also Martel, The Consumer Product
Safety Act And Its Relation to Private Products Litigation, 10 FORUM 337 (1974).
"The trial court and the court of appeals both reached the same conclusion. Swenson, 374 N.W. 2d at 695.
3MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subd. 1(1984).
"Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 693.
-"See supra note 30.
"Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 697.
'Seesupra note IS. Id. at 693.
41This is the classic argument of relation back and is similar in all jurisdictions, federal or state.
42Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 696.
"Since the defendants had sufficient notice, it meant they had a reasonable time and a fair opportunity to
prepare an adequate defense. Id. at 696.
'The trial court found that the amended claim related back to the explosion laccidentl and therefore was not
barred by the statute. The court of appeals affirmed finding that the "negligent failure" to provide (warning
of a product defect) claim is directly related to the alleged violation of the Act. Because defendants had
notice of the conduct asserted in the amendment it related back. Id. at 696.
R ECENT CASESSummer, 19861
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and (4) the defendant knowingly violated the CPSA 5 by failing to notify the
Commission of a known substantial product hazard."6 The court felt that the
amended claim only alleged that defendants failed to report the defect to the
Commission. The court held that knowledge of this allegation was not essen-
tial to the preparation of an adequate defense.47
Although limitation periods are usually more clear, the fact that no period
has been included in the CPSA should alert future parties to a potential bat-
tleground. Formation of arguments should be based upon the major objectives
of Congress in adopting the CPSA.
INTERPRETATIVE OR SUBSTANTIVE RULE
The private cause of action under the CPSA is peculiar because it lies not
for a violation of rules and regulations of the CPSA itself, but for a violation of
rules and regulations of the Commission.
The CPSA provides a federal private cause of action for any person in-
jured by a knowing violation of a Commission rule.4" Commission rules49 define
the terms of the reporting requirement placed upon manufacturers,
distributors or retailers who obtain information of a substantial product
hazard." The Swenson court recognized that the Commission promulgated the
rule in question as an interpretive rule rather than a substantive rule." In other
words, the Commission issued the rule as an interpretation of 15 U.S.C. §
2064(b).52 The Commission characterizes a violation of a substantive rule as a
violation of the CPSA.53 Contrarily, the Commission viewed a violation of an
interpretative rule as not necessarily a violation of law. A violation of an inter-
pretive rule is a violation of the law under which it was issued only if the rule
reasonably interprets the law.
Therefore, the major issue presented in Swenson was whether the alleged
violation of the interpretive rule" states a private cause of action under Section
207256 of the Act. After a lengthy discussion, the court ruled affirmatively for
4115 U.S.C. § 2072(a)( 1982); supra, note 22.
4Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 697.
71d. at 697.
"
1See supra note 22.
"See supra note 17.
1- 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a)(2) defines "substantial product hazard" as: "a product defect which (because of the pat-
tern of defect, the number of defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or other-
wise) creates a substantial risk of injury to the public."
"See, 43 Fed. Reg. 34,988 (1978), codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ Ii 15.1-.22 (1985).
3243 Fed. Reg. 34,988, 34,990 (1978).
53Id.
5ld.
"See supra note 17.
"See supra note 22.
"The trial court and the court of appeals in Swenson ruled that based on the plain language of section 2072
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1
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the plaintiff. They based the holding upon the plain language of Section 2072,
the relevant federal precedent and general principles of federal administrative
law. 8 An understanding of the court's three tiered analysis is essential for suc-
cess in subsequent actions under the CPSA.
Utilizing the finding in CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,5" the court viewed its
first task in interpreting the CPSA as examining the language of the statute for
clearly expressed legislative intent contrary to allowing a private cause of ac-
tion.6 The court found that the legislative history of the CPSA reflects no at-
tempt to define "rule" in Section 2072 as used in the phrase "any other rule or
order issued by the Commission."6 Because the definition of "rule" in the
federal Administrative Procedure Act 62 includes interpretive rules, the court
had another reason to hold that a violation of an interpretive rule issued by the
Commission gives rise to a private right of action under the plain language of
Section 2072.63
Next, the court supported its conclusion with other federal court decisions
on this issue. Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co. 64 involved a suit over injury
sustained by the explosion of a water heater. The plaintiff there also asserted a
claim under the CPSA. Bolstering their own conclusion, the Swenson court
cited Butcher for the authority that the Commission is permitted to pro-
mulgate two types of rules under the CPSA, consumer product safety rules and
administrative rules.65 According to Butcher, consumer product safety rules
are designed to prohibit the manufacture and sale of dangerous products,
whereas administrative rules aid the Commission in the promulgation of con-
sumer product safety rules mandating disclosure of product defects.' Con-
cluding that Congress did not limit the private cause of action to violations of
consumer product safety rules, Butcher held that a violation of a disclosure
rule was also actionable under Section 2072.67
Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co. also involved a plaintiff seeking to
and general principles of federal administrative laws, it allowed a private cause of action. Swenson, 356
N.W.2d 313, 319.
"Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 700.
"447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
6 The Supreme Court said in CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) that absent a clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.
"Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 693; see. S. REP. No. 92-835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.; 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4573; CONF. REP. No. 92-1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1972 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 4596, 4650.
25 U.S.C. § 551 (4) (1982).
61Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 699 (emphasis added).
"See supra note 20.
5Butcher 550 F. Supp. at 695-96.
"6d. at 696.
61d. at 698-99.
RI-CENT CASi-SSummer, 19861
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recover damages for the death of her husband as a result of the explosion of a
water heater in their home. 8 The Swenson court cited Young for the proposi-
tion that the substantial product hazard reporting regulation interprets the
manufacturer's statutory duty to disclose substantial product hazards.69
Therefore, Young held that the reporting rule fit the language "any other rule
or order of the Commission," and that its violation was actionable under Sec-
tion 2072.70
The court in Swenson correctly noted that the majority of federal case law
has been decided in the same manner.7' Morris v. Coleco," on the other hand,
held that no private action under Section 2072 for an asserted violation of Sec-
tion 2064 exists. The Swenson court distinguished the Morris decision. Morris
did not involve an alleged violation of the interpretive rule explaining Section
2064. Rather, Morris involved an alleged violation of the CPSA itself. Section
2072 does not have language allowing a private action for violation of the
CPSA but only for violation of rules promulgated under the statute.3
The defendants launched one more set of defensive arguments." They
argued that recognition of such a cause of action is contrary to fundamental
principles of administrative law and would lead to absurd results. 75 Their
arguments hinged on the court's opinion that interpretive rules did not create
binding obligations.
Initially, the court held that the distinction between legislative and inter-
pretive rules in federal administrative law is the scope of review used by the
courts in assessing their validity. 7 The Swenson court viewed legislative rules
as having the force and effect of law. The validity of legislative rules are tested
"560 F. Supp. 288.
"Id., 560 F. Supp. at 292-93.
0Id. at 293.
7 See supra note 20.
"See supra note 2 1.
13This is the same logic the Swenson court utilized to dispense with Morris. Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 700.
"Defendants argued that interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law and are therefore not
binding regulations that can be violated. They also argued that allowing private parties to sue for damages
for violation of interpretive rules would improperly convert interpretive rules into substantive binding rules.
They reasoned that allowance of a private cause of action would be illogical because private litigants could
enforce a Commission rule that the Commission itself could not enforce. Finally, they contended that since
an interpretive rule is not binding, violation of an interpretive rule is really a violation only of the statute the
rule interprets. Id.
75 Id.
76 Legislative rules are said to have the 'force and effect of law' - i.e. they are as binding on the courts
as any statute enacted by Congress . . . 'A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations
simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a different manner.' Legislative rules are valid
so long as they are reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation, promulgated in com-
pliance with statutory procedures, and not arbitrary or capricious. Interpretive rules, in contrast, have
only persuasive force. Such rules are entitled to varying degrees of deference or weight, but a review-
ing court ordinarily is free to substitute its own view of the relevant statute.
Production Tool Corp. v. Employment and Training Admin., 688 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 20:1
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under a deferential scope of review." The interpretive rules, on the other hand,
can be authoritative if they survive closer scrutiny.78
In Swenson, the court applied close scrutiny and held that (1) the rule
should represent a long-standing position of the agency;79 (2) the rule should be
a permissible gloss on the statute in light of the statute's language, structure
and legislative history; 0 (3) and the rule cannot contradict the plain meaning of
the statute.8' The court found adequate support for giving the rule82 authorita-
tive effect. First, the court noted that notice and comment procedures, not re-
quired for promulgation of interpretive rules, were followed.83 The court also
noted the Commission's evident thoroughness in its consideration of the rule.8"
Lastly, the court held that the rule is a reasonable interpretation of the
CPSA in light of the language of the disclosure provision and the structure and
purposes of the CPSA. 5 The purpose of the CPSA, according to the court, is to
protect consumers from unreasonable risk of injury due to consumer
products.86 Since the disclosure requirement is the source of the information
needed by the Commission to identify dangerous consumer products, the
Swenson court ruled that it is crucial to the attainment of the CPSA's purpose.
Moreover, the court found the short time limits for filing the initial reports"
were reasonable in light of the Commission's need to protect the public as soon
"Legislative rules receive more deference from the courts because they are the product of an exercise of del-
egated power to make law through rules. 2 K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE. § 7:8 (2d ed. 1979).
"Interpretive rules are not promulgated pursuant to delegated legislative power and their promulgation need
not follow the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment procedure, therefore courts evaluate
their validity under stricter standards than when reviewing legislative rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); New Jer-
sey v. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 670 F.2d 1262, 1281 3d Cir. 1981); Swenson, 374 N.W.2d at 702.
'General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976) (reh g denied in 429 U.S. 1079) (1977).
"'Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. I, 11 (1980).
"Fmali Herb, Inc. v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
"This is the interpretive rule at issue in Swenson.
"The reporting regulation was published as a proposed rule in 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 46,720 (1977). The Com-
mission followed notice and comment procedures and held two public hearings on the rule before issuing it
as an interpretive rule in 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,988 (1978).
"See 43 Fed. Reg. 34,988-98 (1979) where the Commission summarized the views of proponents and op-
ponents to the proposed interpretive regulations and carefully explained its reasoning for adopting the rule
in its present form.
"Swenson. 374 N.W.2d at 702.
"'H.R. REP. No. 92-1153, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 21 (1972).
"The Commission must establish and maintain an Injury Information Clearinghouse for collection and
analysis of injury data. The CPSA requires manufacturers, distributors, and retailers to report to the Com-
mission any information they obtain which reasonably supports the conclusion that a consumer product
contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard. If the Commission determines that the
product defect reported presents a substantial product hazard it can require the manufacturer, distributor, or
retailer to notify the general public, or consumer of the defect; order the defect be repaired: order the product
replaced with a safe product; or order a refund of the purchase price of the product. 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a)) I),
2064(b)-(d) (1982).
"Manufacturers have a ten day time period to conduct a reasonably expeditious investigation to evaluate
the reportability of a death or grievous bodily injury or other information. If they find information that
reasonably supports the conclusion that their product contains a defect which could create a substantial
product hazard, they have 24 hours to report to the Commission. 16 C.F.R. 1115.13(c), 11 15.14(c), (e).
Summer, 19861 R ECENT CASES
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as possible. This ruling is consistent with the mandate of Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall,"9 that safety legislation is to be liberally construed to effectuate the
congressional purpose.
The Swenson and Butcher" decisions regarding interpretive rules have
been criticized.' It has been contended that in promulgating the interpretive
regulation regarding the reporting provisions, the Commission noted a distinc-
tion between the substantive rules and the interpretive regulations.92 In par-
ticular, critics argue that the court ignores the fact that the CPSA does not
speak of general interpretive regulations.93 In addition, critics point to Section
15 of the Act which does not authorize Commission rules or orders relating to
the reporting of information to the Commission other than those specified, but
rather contains specific statutory penalties for failure to report."
Opponents of the Butcher ruling accuse the court of ignoring the fact that
15 U.S.C. § 2072 does not create a cause of action for a violation of the CPSA
itself.9 They therefore assert that Morris96 held correctly in finding that it
could hardly have been Congress' intent to create a cause of action for a viola-
tion of the Commission's interpretation of the CPSA.97 In the critic's view, as
well as the Morris court's, the better interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 2072 limits
the private cause of action to a violation of specific Commission rules and
orders which are described in detail in the Act.9
It is apparent that courts are not subscribing to this line of reasoning. In
Wilson v. Robertshaw Controls Co., another case involving injury due to a
water heater explosion, the court was not persuaded that Section 2072 should
be construed in the restrictive manner suggested by the critics." They held that
Section 2072 by its express terms provides a plaintiff with a private remedy
thereby concluding that the interpretive rule has met the close scrutiny test.
OTHER OBJECTIONS
Defendants have presented the "floodgates" argument, contending that to
permit a private cause of action under the Act would federalize the law of
"'Marshall, 445 U.S. at II.
'See supra note 20.
"'Sisk, Product SaetY Rules: A Theoryfor Recovery? 27 FoR THI- Di-. 28-32, May (1985).
'243 Fed. Reg. 34.990 119784.
"Sisk. supra note 91. at 31.
1ld. at 31.
"I'd.
"See supra note 2 1.
"'Judge Warner's opinion in Morris v. Coleco Industries, 587 F. Supp. 8, 9 IE.D. Va. 1984) held that it would
be illogical that Congress would have supposed that a failure to disclose a mishap to the Commission might
proximately cause an injury.
"Sisk. supra note 91, at 32.
'600 F. Supp. (N.D. Ind. 1985).
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products liability by giving every plaintiff who alleges noncompliance with a
Commission rule a federal forum."' However, the Butcher' court felt this is
precisely the result Congress intended. That finding does have factual support.
Congress made express findings that control by state and local governments of
unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products may be
burdensome to manufacturers. 12 Further, they found that regulation of con-
sumer products is necessary to carry out the protection of the public against
unreasonable risks of injury.'
It is of further interest to note that plaintiffs have persuaded courts to in-
clude them in a class that benefits from an agency relationship existing be-
tween the Commission and all the members of the consuming public in the
United States. 14 In this fashion plaintiffs have successfully argued that a fraud
[failure to report a known defect] worked upon an agent [the Commission] by a
third person is deemed to have been worked upon the principal. 5 Defensive
arguments are parallel to the lack of standing arguments in taxpayer suits,"
namely that the plaintiff unjustly seeks to litigate what is fundamentally a
generalized injury shared equally by all members of the general public.07 The
Butcher court defeated this argument by holding: (1) the plaintiffs sued to
recover for a specific injury not a generalized one; (2) their injuries had a
substantial nexus to the acts or omission of the defendants; and (3) given that
the court held a private cause of action existed, the plaintiffs had an explicit
legislative grant of standing to sue. 08
CONCLUSION
Complete and timely reporting of all information suggesting potential
product hazards is seen as the crucial element to present and future effec-
tiveness of the Commission.' 9 To the extent that Swenson v. Emerson Electric
is the precursor of future trends in products liability law, timely and complete
reporting under Section 15 takes on new importance." By any conservative
estimate, only a small fraction of this data is currently being reported to the
luwButcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692, 700 (D. Md. 198 1).
101id.
1215 U.S.C. § 205 I(a)(4).
-i15 U.S.C. § 205I(a)(6).
"'Butcher, 550 F. Supp. at 702.
7UOSee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY. § 315 (1957); 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency 290 and n. 5 (1962).
I See. e.g.. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (suit by taxpayer to restrain expenditures).
0'7Butcher. 550 F. Supp. at 702.
lusld.
'*Statler, Reporting Guidelines Under Section 15 of the Consumer Product Safety Act. 7 J. OF PROD. LIA.
88-106 (1984).
"
0For instance, courts may be more inclined to enter an interlocutory order granting leave for plaintiffs to
amend their complaint to add a products liability cause of action under Section 23 of the CPSA as was done
in Payne v. A.O. Smith, 578 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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Commission. Although few products liability defense lawyers have had to
litigate an action brought under the CPSA, it appears certain that if strict
reporting procedures are not initiated, litigation is inescapable. A reassessment
of reporting procedures must occur. These procedures should be perceived not
only as an obligation under the law, but also as a means to ward off private
civil suits instigated under the CPSA.
The deregulatory efforts of the Reagan administration has led to the
budgetary cuts of the Commission. Perhaps this upsurge and promotion of
private causes of action is the Commission's way of dealing with less money in
its pocket. The holding in Swenson makes it possible to force compliance with
consumer products safety regulations without the expenditure of taxpayer's
dollars and without any government activity.
The Commission has formed alliances with other organizations to help
reach their goals of protecting an unsuspecting public."' Its information is
open to the public, and more importantly, to the trial attorneys of the
American Trial Lawyers Association Products Liability-Exchange. This
cooperative relationship involves the sharing of information which the
organizations have gathered in an effort to promote the goals of each organiza-
tion. The Commission's information may become an invaluable tool for plain-
tiff's lawyers and consumer advocates."' This information could be deva-
stating for defendants. It is relevant to note that already, plaintiffs attorneys in
products cases are being urged to include a count or amend existing complaints
to alleging a cause of action based on the CPSA."3 It cannot be denied that the
evolution of warnings by manufacturers, distributors and retailers in product
liability suits has undergone a new and unfamiliar twist.
STEPHEN GRIFFIN
"'See Babij, Industry Fails to Report Products Hazards, 20 TRIAL 62 (Oct. 1984).
"'See Statler, CPSC: Only a Beginning, 16 TRIAL 77-81 (Nov. 1980).
'See Comment, The Impact of Restrictive Disclosure Provisions on Freedom of Information Act Requests:
An Analysis of Section 6(bXI) of the Consumer Product Safety Act. 64 MINN. L. REV. 1021-1059 (1980).
[Vol. 20:1
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss1/9
